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INTRODUCTION
Under the tradition of our Anglo-American legal and criminal
system, we have in marked contrast differentiated the handling of
ordinary criminals from psychotic and feeble-minded offenders. We
have maintained two separate and distinct sets of procedures for these
groups, employing civil methods of commitments for the latter. Origi-
nally there arose a widespread conviction that in the general, over-all
field of delinquency there was a special class designated as defective
delinquents who should not be sent to ordinary prisons but who should
receive special handling adapted to meet their peculiar needs. And
historically, society has quite early recognized that its interests might
best be protected through administering medical treatment as opposed
to imprisonment for insane criminal offenders.
A striking aspect of this type of procedure is that the commitments
are for indeterminate lengths of time. Parole or complete freedom
is given only upon the reestablishment of sufficient control and mental
stability. This is diametrically opposed to the mode of handling the
criminal. In that case we have felt it important that a maximum period
be set for sentence in accordance with the seriousness of the crime or
the dangerousness of the offender.
Throughout the years another exception has crept into criminal pro-
cedure in the defense of insanity, the case of the irresistible impulse.
This is a radical extension of the same theory inasmuch as the offender
is considered not insane.
Most recently, however, still another extension of this concept has
been made in affording similar treatment to sane criminal sex offenders
who are found to be what has been loosely characterized as sexual
psychopaths. Up to this time we have avoided granting any exception
to neurotics or psychopaths on the ground that they know what they
are doing and if they so desired could control their behavior. However,
because the spotlight of public attention has focused in recent times on
several brutal sex crimes involving children, a great clamor has arisen for
the suppression and control of these atrocities. It is quite easy to under-
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stand the public apprehension in view of weird cases like that of Albert
Fish, sixty-five years old, who has been described as "a meek and in-
nocuous little old man, gentle and benevolent, friendly and polite",
who practiced eighteen different acts of perversion according to an
examination by a psychiatrist in 1928 and was credited with sexual
crimes upon at least one hundred children and the murder of five after
he became impotent, not to speak of an admission of cannibalism, for
he actually ate some of his victims.
Through the combined efforts of sociologists, psychiatrists and
of criminologists (for the first time in legal history) there arose a
series of sex psychopath statutes in sixteen states and the District
of Columbia designed to meet the sex crime problem.1 But notoriety,
born of sensationalism and crying for hasty action, very often has the
effect of distorting the extent and nature of the problem. While it might
be relatively easy to pass social legislation in answer to public clamor
and agitation for new and stringent laws, it is quite another matter
to satisfy the demands of constitutionality and practicability. Some
pertinent phases of this question have been segregated in the following
categories of interest.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Extension of insanity concept
The legislature's extension of the concept of insanity to include
sexually irresponsible persons appears on the surface to be well within
the boundaries of the lawful exercise of state police power. In this
country that same power, formerly exercised by the king through
his lord chancellor, is now exercised by the state in its role as parens
patriae.2 As cited in a number of supreme court decisions, the legislature
is free to recognize degrees of harm and to confine its restrictions to
those classes where the need is deemed the clearest.3
1. CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE §5500 et seq. (Deering Supp. 1949) ; D.C. CODE
§22-3501 et seq. (Supp. VII 1949); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §38 et seq. (Supp. 1949); 4 IND.
STAT. ANN. §9-3401 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1949) ; 4 MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 123A (Supp. 1948) ;
25 MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.967(1) et seq. (Supp. 1949) ; 31 MINN. STAT. ANN. §526.09 et seq.
(1947) ; 19 Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §9359.1 et seq. (Supp. 1949) ; NEB. LAWS, c. 294 (1949) ;
N. H. LAWS, c. 314 (1949) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. §2.192-1, 4 et seq. (Supp. 1949); OHIO GEN.
CODE §13451-19 et seq. (Page Supp. 1949) (not limited to sexual psychopathic offenders) ;
VT. REV. STAT. §6699 et seq. (1947) ; WASH. LAWS, c. 273 (1947), as amended, WASH. LAWS,
c. 198 (1949) ; I Wis. STAT. §5137 et seq. (1947).
2. State ex rel. Paxton v. Guinotte 257 Mo. 1, 165 S.W. 718 (1914).
3. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297
(1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 (1939) ; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
Compulsory vaccination laws [Jacobsen v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1904)]; quarantine [186
U.S.. 380 (1902)]; sterilization [Buck v. Bell 274, U.S. 200 (1927); In re Hendrickson 12
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Civil v. criminal procedure
In determining the constitutionality of the sex psychopath statutes,
the crux of our consideration rests upon the judicial determination of
whether the proceedings under the act are criminal or civil.4 No one
questions the power of the state to commit to institutions mentally
unbalanced persons who become dangerous to the peace and safety of
the community. The care, treatment and indeterminate commitment
of persons who are insane, mentally deranged, emotionally or mentally
ill, has long been considered a civil rather than a criminal proceeding.5
The object of the state is to offer a method for protecting society from
the acts of such persons by placing them in such confinement as would
be favorable to their cure. This commitment is not regarded as a
punishment or a sentence. Consequently, the normal guarantees so
jealously guarded by the courts in criminal proceedings do not apply to
civil commitment procedures.6
Parens patriae doctrine
This parens patriae doctrine, implemented through civil commitment
proceedings, is the underlying theory behind the sex psychopath laws.
In State ex rel Swetzer v. Green7 the court in certifying the validity
of the Missouri statute stated the act was not punitive but similar in
character and purpose to other statutes providing for a civil inquiry
into the sanity of a person and also similar to various juvenile statutes
which place certain minors charged with the commission of a crime into
a separate and distinct class, making available substitutive remedial
Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942)] (examples of public safeguards established to protect the
peace and safety of the community).
4. The framers of the first Michigan statute made the mistake of placing the statute in
the criminal code. As a result in People v. Frotczak 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938),
the court declared the statute void on grounds of double jeopardy and lack of jury trial. This
defect was shortly remedied however by a new statute which was upheld in People v. Chap-
man 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W. 2d 18 (1942).
5. In re Breese 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991 (1891) ; In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d
142 (1940) ; Hirst v. Cramer, 195 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. 1946); McGoldrick v. Downs 184 Misc.
168, 53 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
6. Hirst v. Cramer, supra note 5; McGoldrick v. Downs, supra note 5; In re Dowdell 169
Mass. 387 (1897). (In this case the court held that the commitment of the insane under the
state statute did not violate the 14th Amendment) ; In re Estate Rogers 147 Neb. 1, 22 N.W.2d
297 (1946) ; State v. Green, infra note 7; State v. Chapman, supra note 4; People v. Sims
382 Ill. 472, 47 N.E.2d 703 (1943); People v. Redlich, 83 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. 1949). In
this case the court declared that the purpose of the statute is to prevent a person afflicted with
such mental disorders from being tried for criminal offenses until sufficient recovery can be
made for such psychopathy. Henry Weihofen and Winfred Overholser claim that the pro-
ceeding is neither civil nor criminal, but rather a special one "conducted primarily for the
benefit of the person whose mental state is in question and it bears no resemblance to an
action either civil or criminal." Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
24 TEXAS L. REV. (1946).
7. 232 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1950).
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procedures in place of criminal ones. Under this doctrine of parens
patriae Judge Conkling said the state not only has the right but the
duty of guardianship to those persons who are non sui juris and who
are found to be dangerous to the health, morals and safety of its citizens
as well as to themselves.8
One of the purposes of these statutes is to escape the rigidity of
criminal proceedings. 9 The objectives of the act are remedial, thera-
peutic and preventive, said the court in a recent New Hampshire case.10
It seeks to cure and prevent rather than punish. The protection of
society as well as the benefit of the individual are the main objectives,
all of which spells out a civil rather than a criminal proceeding. 1Oa
Theory v. practice
However, what might in theory amount to a perfectly valid exercise
of state police power, might also in practice constitute an unlawful
deprivation of personal liberty and property. The Supreme Court in
State ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,"1 anticipating
just such a potential abuse, warned that a law of this type though "fair
on its face and impartial in appearance" was nevertheless open to abuse
in its administration. Developing this thought, the court continued,
"It would not be reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to
every person guilty of sexual misconduct, or even to persons having
strong sexual propensities." Such a definition would not only make the
act impractical of enforcement and perhaps unconstitutional 12 in its ap-
plication, but would also be an unwarranted extension of the meaning
of the words defined.13
Are we to judge these sex psychopath statutes solely in the light of
their objective purposes? Or do these statutes perhaps in practice con-
stitute a misuse of the state's power to sacrifice personal liberties?
8. In a late Illinois case [People v. George, 95 N.E.2d 606 (Ill. 1950)] the statute was
declared constitutional. For similar decisions see: In re Turner, 94. Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871
(1915) ; McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla, 1, 205 Pac. 917 (1922). For articles on the constitu-
tionality of these acts see Notes, 96 U. of PA. L. REv. 872 (1948); 37 MIcH. L. REV. 613
(1939) ; 1 STAN. L. REV. 486 (1949).
9. See Note, 39 COL. L. REV. 534 (1939).
10. In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 27 (1951).
10a. In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652; 36 A.B.A.J. 665 (1944). "A Crim-
inal proceeding is a proceeding which is prosecuted by the state against a person charged
with a public offense to obtain punishment therefor." McGoldrich v. Downs, supra note 5.
11. Supra note 3.
12. There is a.very strong presumption of constitutionality as regards state statutes and
the Supreme Court will not declare them invalid except upon inescapable grounds. 11 Am.
JuR., Constitutional Law §128 (1937).
13. Notwithstanding this, the court stated the assumption must be maintained that
the state court will protect the constitutional rights of persons so charged and adequately
safeguard these rights at every step of the proceedings.
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It might be in order at this juncture to inspect some of the underlying
concepts and issues inherent in the answers to these questions.
POLICE POWER
All inclusiveness of these powers
While the use of the term "police power" is essentially modern, its
counterpart may be found in early Greek and Roman law where the
state assumed responsibility for the public safety and health of its
citizens. As developed through necessity, it has become one of the
broadest powers of the state.' 4 In its enlarged meaning the Supreme
Court has said that "the police power is not subject to any definite lim-
itation but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safe-
guard of the public interest."15
All rights, individual or otherwise, are held subject to the police
power of the state.' 6 In Varholy v. Sweet, Sheriff, a Florida Supreme
Court case decided in 1943, it was held that while the 14th Amendment
"authorized the Federal Court to declare invalid state laws abridging
the rights of citizens or denying due process of law, it was not intended
to interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives, liberty and
property of the citizens of the state and to promote education, good
order, health, peace and morals."
The sex offender acts have been justified in a great many test
cases under these broad police powers under the theory that the threat
to the public safety justifies the passage of these laws. In State ex rel
Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, the court pointed out that
a law which presumably hits "the evil where it is most felt" is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
applied. In State v. Green the court said that it was the legislature's
prerogative to conclude that the need for detention and treatment of
sexual psychopaths is a type of harm from which society needs protec-
tion. In an Illinois Supreme Court case17 it was stated, "the state not
only has the power but the duty to protect society from persons who are
sex criminals and who have not recovered from their criminal propensi-
ties while serving in the penitentiary." But the court in this case also
stated that in addition to public safety, public morals were involved,
14. Police power is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public
safety, health and morals and to justify the destruction or abatement by summary proceed-
ings of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance.
15. Canfield v. U. S., 167 U.S. 518 (1897), citing Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E.
390 (1888).
16. Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 115 Mass. 153 (1874).
17. People ex rel. Elliott v. Juergens, 95 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1950).
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both of which are among well-settled grounds upon which police power
may be exercised.
Limitations of police power
However broad and all-inclusive police powers may be,:' it is equally
well settled that these powers are subject to definite limitations. The
exercise of police power must be reasonable. Constitutional guarantees
of personal liberty and private property can not be unreasonably and
arbitrarily invaded. These constitutional guarantees do not limit the
exercise of the police power of the state to preserve the pjblic health,
safety, morals, etc. only so long as "that power is reasonably and fairly
exercised and not abused."' 9
Do these statutes pass the test of valid exercise of police power.?
Conversely, one might say that to constitute a valid exercise having
a "reasonable relation to a proper purpose" the exercise of the statute
in practice must be effective and accomplish the purpose for which it was
intended. It must, indeed, "hit the evil where it is most felt." Here
our sex offender acts fall miserably short. These laws are never used
in some states, and seldom used in others because they are dangerous
in principle. 20 They are, therefore, unimportant in such states. Six-
teen persons were confined under this law in Illinois within ten years
after its enactment. In Minnesota the law decreased from thirty-five
for the first year to about ten per year thereafter for about a ten-year
period. (Most of these were for homosexuality and were released
within a few months.)
Fallacies concerning the sex offender
The ineffectiveness of our present sex psychopathic laws2' stems in
part from the hasty manner in which they were enacted without proper
scientific investigation and partly from many fallacies that have existed
and, strangely enough, still persist. 'Isolated sex crimes of the more
atrocious type have led to widespread publicity on the subject. The
18. The asexualization of habitual sex criminals was upheld as constitutional in Davis v.
Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
19. RUSSELL, THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE (1900.) "It has been said that the test when
such regulations are called in question, is whether they have some actual and reasonable
relation to the maintenance and promotion of the public health and welfare and whether
such is in fact the end sought to be obtained." Also, "In determining the constitutionality of
a state police power statute, the question is whether its restrictions have a reasonable
relation to a proper purpose." Keokee Coke Company v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
20. Sutherland, Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CiIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543 (1950).
21. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW (1951).
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flame of popular zeal has been further fanned by misinformed writers.
Many of these fallacies have been exploded in Dr. Paul W. Tappan's
comprehensive report to the New Jersey Legislature,2 2 some of which
are:
1. That there are tens of thousands of sex fiends abroad in the
land.2 3
2. That sex offenders are usually recidivous. 24
3. That sex offenders progress to more serious types of crime.2 5
4. That it is possible to predict the danger of sex crimes to be
committed 26
5. That sex psychopathy or sex deviation is a clinical entity.27
6. That these individuals are over-sexed. The reverse is usually true.
7. That effective treatment methods to cure sex offenders are already
known and employed.28
8. That the laws passed recently in one quarter of the states are
getting at the brutal and vicious sex criminal.2 9
9. That civil adjudication of the sex deviate or an indeterminate
22. TAPPAN, THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER (Report to the New Jersey Legislature, 1950).
23. "Most Sex Offenders are charged with relatively minor crimes. They are not for
the most part degenerate, sex fiends who are potential killers."
24. Sex offenders have a low rate of recidivism. In figures compiled thru the F.B.I. it
rates seventeenth and is almost at the bottom of the list. Sutherland, supra note 20.
The type of offender spoken of and also as one incapable of learning from experience and
given to repetitive misconduct in these matters, is part of a small minority of the total sex
offenders.
25. The danger of murder by a relative or other intimate associate is very much greater
than the danger of murder by an unknown sex fiend. Sutherland, supra note 20.
26. "There is much vagueness in the public mind as to what is a sexual criminal. To some
he is a sex maniac, a terrible monster of some sort that threatens their peace and security.
Usually one has in mind a brutal assault on some child, or possibly a rape or other similar
assault. The meaning or frequency of sex crimes, or other relation to the over-all problem
of crime in general, is a subject little known to the general public. The prevalence of
prostitution as an inescapable evil, or of homosexuality or other perversions, are looked
upon with mixed feelings of tolerance, contempt, and indifference. But should one revolting
sex crime take place, the entire community is aroused and the spotlight of attention centers
upon the whole sex picture, arousing public spirit and action, which after a time of
appeasement, finally peters out, and the so-called sex crime wave disappears. The actual
presence of any sex crime wave is subject to serious doubt. Valid statistics cannot substan-
tiate that sex crimes are on the increase." Karpman, The Sexual Psychopath, 42 J. CRLM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 184 (1951).
27. In Ravenscroft, Examination of the Nebraska Statute, 29 NEB. L. BULL. 506 (1950),
the writer claims that the psychopath definitely is not identifiable, and that as a result there
is vagueness and indefiniteness in the statutes.
28. There is one psychiatrist for every 600 clinics doing preventive work for the general
public, and one for every 221,600 of population. Personal clinical psy'chologists and psychiat-
ric social workers and special nurses trained for psychopathic cases meet only a small
fraction of the current needs. There is a lack of institutional study on the treatment and
cure of the sex deviate. The above is according to Dr. Raymond Waggoner, director of
the Neuro-Psychiatric Institute and a member of the State Mental Health Commission of
Michigan.
29. See PLASCOWE, supra note 21, and TAPPAN, supra note 22. Professor PAUL W. TAP-
-AN'S report to New Jersey Legislature, supra note 21.
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commitment to a mental hospital is similar to our handling of the insane
and therefore civil liberties and due process are not involved. (This
point will be dealt with in greater detail later in this article.)
10. That the sex problem can be solved merely by passing a new
law.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Just what constitutional safeguards are involved in our consideration
of the validity of these statutes? How have the states, in the enact-
ment of these statutes and in the proceedings under them, discharged
their duties with respect to these constitutional safeguards? judge
Ploscowe in his book cited above, in speaking of our constitutional
heritage says, "This tradition takes a bad beating at the hands of the
sex psychopath laws. For, by the simple device of shifting the basis
of jurisdiction from the criminal side of the law to the civil side, these
laws make it possible to keep men in protective custody for periods up
to a lifetime." The use of this legal expediency becomes necessary in
the face of the deprivation of these fundamental rights. But how
far can we go in validating the usurpation of these constitutional rights
where these laws do not accomplish their purpose, do not protect society
from the threat of harm involved and do not in fact hit "the evil where
it is most felt."
The states have in various and sundry ways attempted to answer
this dilemma, some of which we shall next consider.
Due process
Behavior scientists, who have to a great extent fathered these stat-
utes, have been recommending for quite some time that we stop sen-
tencing on the basis of the crime committed. Indeed they propose that
we should not sentence at all at the time of conviction in any fixed terms,
but rather for an indefinite term. They recommend this on the theory
that if you continue unnecessary supervision when the offender has
reached a point of improvement he is apt to deteriorate again. From
that point of view you may have an individual who has committed
quite a serious crime who, after a very brief period of treatment, may
be well enough adjusted to return to the community.
On our main point of issue on the other hand, the opposite is the
case with trivial offenders, who are not aided by any amount of pro-
tection and who are not a potential threat to the community. These
statutes make no distinction between the dangerous sex criminal and
the ordinary run of sex deviants such as homosexuals, exhibitionists,
1954]
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peepers, fetishists and frotteurs. In view of the lack of capacity of
prisons and clinical criteria to tell when a person is ready to be released,
may not the "forgotten man" be increasing?"0 Where there is admit-
tedly no successful treatment for the peepers, is the indefinite incar-
ceration of such an individual justified in view of the small amount
of annoyance he causes? No amount of legal abstraction or juggling
of nomenclature from criminal to civil can defend this stand. In at
least five3 1 of the states, persons may be adjudicated sex psychopaths
without having first been charged or convicted of a crime. In many
of the other states there need only be a charge of a crime without a
conviction.
The New Jersey statute calls for a conviction first for certain speci-
fied criminal offenses, coupled with a psychiatric diagnosis which, taken
together, may result in an adjudication of psychopathy. The period
of confinement for treatment is definitely limited and coextensive with
the maximum criminal sentence for the crime involved. The New
Jersey statute is a safeguard against indefinite incarceration which
may stem from psychiatric premonitions and conclusions about which
the psychiatrists themselves disagree. It also prevents the indefinite
confinement from ever advancing from the therapeutic to the punitive
or correctional stage because of insufficient therapeutic facilities and
personnel. Thomas A. Larremore,3 2 in his report on this and three
other articles, points out, however, two criticisms of the New Jersey
statute: "First, they fail to provide for the preventive adjudication
of deviants, and, second, they do permit release of individuals still
dangerous and needing treatment. ' '3 3  In view of the fact that our
legal system demands a certain amount of reasonable definiteness where
the deprivation of individual liberties is at stake, it is quite understand-
able why there has been little use made of the statutes in Massachu-
setts, Illinois and the District of Columbia.
In all fairness it should be pointed out that the states have made
30. From the point of view of many psychiatrists, the great weakness in our sytsem of
criminal law is that under penal statutes a person convicted of a crime must be released
at the attainment of his maximum sentence. This is so even though it may be apparent at
the expiration of the maximum that the individual is still a dangerous person, who probably,
upon his return to the community, will inflict additional injuries and engage in further
violations of the criminal law. Actually short prison terms will not cure but will tend by
way of example to discourage indiscreet homosexuals and other minor sex deviants.
31. Wisconsin, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Washington, District of Columbia and New
Hampshire.
32. Legal consultant to the American Social Hygiene Assn.
33. In Ex Parte Stone, 87 Cal. App. 2d 777, 197 P.2d 847 (1948), the court in its
attempt to protect individual rights and afford due process to all, actually was forced to
release an admittedly dangerous sexual psychopath. This is another example of the in-




some efforts to protect individual rights under our traditional concept
of due process. The right to a writ of habeas corpus which is avail-
able to the insane or mental defectives3 4 is available also to defendants
who have been committed under these actsY
Under the Ohio law the individual must be sent to a penal institu-
tion after his release from a mental hospital to serve a term which,
together with the term already spent in confinement, totals the appli-
cable criminal sentence. In this respect it is similar to the New Jersey
statute. In all other states, the completely indefinite sentence is used.
The Ohio statute also provides for rights at the hearing, to representa-
tion by counsel, use of subpoena, examination and cross-examination as
well as the right to produce witnesses. These very rights were upheld
in a late California case and were held applicable to all individuals
coming within the purview of these statutes.
36
In People v. Barnett,3 7 a California Supreme Court case, it was
claimed that the denial of the court to a hearing on the issue either
before or after the trial constituted an abuse of discretion. Michigan
offers the individual committed as a sexual psychopath a complete
defense to the crime of which the individual was accused at the time
of the filing of the petition. The Indiana statute has a similar pro-
vision. Most of the other statutes, however, claim that commitment
is not a sufficient defense to criminal prosecution.
In Malone v. Overholzer,38 the court pointed out that the defend-
ant's right to counsel, habeas corpus and a fair hearing on the issue
of whether or not he had recovered from his sex psychopathy, was not
to be denied at any time.
A very interesting case, illustrating how some of these procedural
safeguards may be denied, is People v. Irtinian,3 9 a Supreme Court
case dated April 5, 1948. The defendant was originally arraigned
in Detroit on a charge of rape to which a plea of not guilty was entered.
Before trial the prosecuting attorney filed a petition for an examination
of the defendant by a psychiatrist under the Michigan Act,40 alleging
that the defendant was a criminally psychopathic person. The court
granted the petition and appointed a psychiatric commission which
filed a report which stated in brief that they found that the patient
34. Vona v. State, 54 N.Y. Supp.2d 453 (Ct. Cf. 1945). Ravenscroft, supra note 27.
35. In re Kremmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 767
(1946).
Ex parte Stone, supra note 33.
36. People v. Thompson, 227 P.2d 272 (Cal. App. 1951).
37. 27 Cal.2d 64-9, 166 P.2d 4 (1946).
38. 93 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. 1950).
39. 320 Mich. 441, 31 N.W.2d 688 (1948).
40. MIcH STAT. ANN. §28.967(4-) (Supp. 1953).
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was neither psychotic nor feeble-minded and under the acts involved
must therefore be considered a criminal sexual psychopath. The report
further stated that his behavior was compulsive in nature and that he
recognized that he had no control over the expression of his impulses
nor insight into the causes of his deviated behavior. The report con-
cluded with the recommendation that in accordance with the acts in-
volved, the patient be sent to an appropriate institution for treatment
and care. At a subsequent hearing the only testimony that was intro-
duced was that of the two psychiatrists. On the sole basis of this testi-
mony the defendant was adjudged to be a criminal sexual psychopathic
person and was accordingly committed forthwith to a state hospital.
Two years later the defendant filed a motion to set aside the order
of commitment and effect a discharge on the grounds that the petition
failed to contain any of the facts required by the statute and also
because there was no evidence supporting the adjudication made by the
court. From an order denying this motion, the defendant appealed. In
handing down its decision the Supreme Court of Michigan found that
the Lower Court had erred and that the original petition, indeed, did
not contain sufficient facts tending to show that the defendant was
a criminal sexual psychopathic person. The court found that the orig-
inal petition was "fatally defective and in consequence the subsequent
proceedings invalid." The omission of the factual basis of this report
was tantamount to saying that the judgment of the doctors was to be
substituted for that of the court. The deprivation of the defendant's
rights at the hearing amounted to denial of due process.
In a leading recent New Hampshire case,4 ' while the court did attest
to the validity of the New Hampshire Act, it also pointed out that
the act was subject to criticism in that it was capable of abuse in appli-
cation. The court said that "when and if abuse is shown, the court
will be open to remedy it. There may be a vast gulf between the objec-
tives of the act and its actual operation, if adequate facilities and
personnel are lacking to effect its objectives."
The attitude of the courts in this type, as well as other similar pro-
ceedings, has consistently been to narrowly limit any abridgment of
these procedural safeguards. In the petition of Morin et al.42 (con-
cerning which certiorari was denied in 1949), the Supreme Court of the
United States admitted that under the Doctrine of parens patriae con-
stitutional guarantees applicable to criminal proceedings did not apply to
proceedings under a statute providing that a child adjudicated a delin-
41. In re Moulton, supra note 10.
42. 289 U.S. 709 (1949).
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quent may be committed to an industrial school for a term of the
child's minority. The court added, however, that "the better practice
would have been to offer further notice and opportunity for hearing
before committal."
Cruel and unusual punishment
Another of our constitutional safeguards is a prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. It has been repeated many times 43 that
these statutes are not punitive but remedial. A very interesting question
is, when does care and treatment end and punishment begin? In ex
parte Stone,43a cited above, the court said, "while it may well be said
that, when by lapse of time it has become probable that as a result of
such a trial the defendant will be acquitted and be entitled to be restored
to his liberty while still a menace to society because of his sex psychop-
athy, it [the court] cannot therefore hold that accused without ever
being granted a trial on the charge against him and without the impo-
sition of any sentence, fix a term of imprisonment." Nor may he, because
he has such a psychopathy, "be bounced from the court to the hospital
and from the hospital back to the court ad infinitum."
The similarity of sex psychopath statutes with those dealing with
the commitment of the insane has of course been stressed in defense
of the former. In ex parte Stone the court pointed out a very interest-
ing distinction between statutes applicable to sexual offenders charged
with a crime and those applicable to the insane, wherein it said,
"Statutes applicable to sex psychopaths charged with crime differ from those appli-
cable to the insane; for sex psychopaths are not necessarily insane and are not by
reason of their mental condition unable to defend themselves from criminal
charges; and if they are convicted of crime and cannot be benefited by hospitali-
zation, the public is as well protected from them when they are committed to a
prison; and if they are innocent of the crime they are entitled to their liberty
until again charged with a crime or committed as insane under proceedings brought
for that purpose under the applicable statutes. The presumption of innocence still
protects the petitioner and he is not to be dealt with as a lawbreaker unless and
until so adjudicated."
There is much difference of opinion as to what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.4 Where because of lack of adequate treat-
43. Notes, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 613, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 872, 1 STAN. L. REV. 486, supra note
8. Also see: People v. Chapman, supra note 4; People v. Sims, supra note 6; In re Moulton,
supra note 10, Sweezer v. Green, supra note 7.
43a. Supra note 33.
44. "Whether a penalty prescribed by municipal ordinance constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by Constitution is not determined by the amount of fine nor length
of the sentence in a penal institution which might be imposed, but rather by the nature of
the punishment." In re Calhoun, 94 N.E.2d 388, 87 Ohio App. 193 (1949).
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ment facilities a deviant is incarcerated for a period of time all out of
proportion to the actual offense complained of, and under conditions
that amount to little or complete absence of treatment, 45 very serious
doubts arise as to whether such unwarranted, prolonged incarceration
might not be considered cruel or unusual punishment.
Self incrimination
The issue of self incrimination has likewise been neatly side-stepped
by classifying the proceeding as a civil rather than a criminal one.4 6
Originally this privilege was designed to protect individuals from giving
testimony under tortuous methods. While the former reverential atti-
tude towards this privilege has somewhat changed in modern opinions,
wherein it is now balanced between the detriment to the individual on
the one hand and the protection of society as well as the efficient admin-
istration of justice on the other hand,47 there can be no doubt that a
clear-cut privilege against self-incrimination still exists.
In Counselman v. Hitchcock,4 8 an oft-cited Supreme Court case
on this subject, the court said,
"It is broadly contended on the point of the appellee that a witness is not entitled
to plead the privilege of silence except in a criminal case against himself; but such
is not the language of the Constitution. Its provision is that no person shall be
compelled in any court case to witness against himself. This provision must have
a broad construction in favor of the right which it was intended to secure ...
The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is broad as mischief against that
which it seeks to guard.... It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that
a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give
testimony which will tend to incriminate him or subject him to fines, penalties or
forfeitures .... We are clearly of the opinion that no statute which leaves the
party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating question
put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Con-
stitution of the United States .... In view of the constitutional provision, a statu-
45. Kemmerer v. Benson, 165 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1948).
46. The following cases hold that the privilege against self incrimination does not
apply in insanity proceedings: State v. Coleman, 96 W.Va. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924);
State v. Chandler, 126 S.C. 149, 119 S.E. 724 (1923) ; Plocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So.
547 (1926) ; GREENLEAF ON EVIDENcE, §469-E (16th ed. 1899) ; State v. Church, 199 Mo. 605,
95 S.W. 16 (1906) ; State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 18 Pac. 934, (1910) ; People v. Austin, 199
N.Y. 446, 93 N.E. 37 (1910) ; People v. Schuyler, 106 N.Y. 298, 12 N.E. 783 (1887) ; People
v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 79 N.E. 978 (1907); People v. Truck, 170 N.Y. 203, 63 N.E. 281
(1902) ; People ex rel, Kemmler v. Durstan, 119 N.Y. 569, 24 N.E. 6 (1890).
The following cases have held that this privilege is applicable only in criminal cases
and not applicable to proceedings under the sex psychopath statutes:
People v. Chapman, supra note 4.
People v. Redlich, supra note 6.
In re Moulton, supra note 10.
47. 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§2250, 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
State v. Milam, 48 So. 2d 594 (Miss. 1950).
48. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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tory enactment, to be valid must afford absolute immunity against future prose-
cution for the offense to which it relates."
Concerning the psychiatric oral examination, two questions are raised:
(1) Does privilege extend to information needed in determining
whether or not the individual is a sexual psychopath, and (2) Does it
apply to information the individual is compelled to discuss and as a
consequence lead to the discovery of the commission of past crimes.
The latter would lead to the possible prosecution for past offenses.
In view of the fact that the whole purpose of this legislation is to
extend the legal concept of insanity to include sexual psychopaths, priv-
ilege does not apply. The defense of privilege in an insanity proceed-
ing has never been upheld. But as to whether this defense applies to
such information as would lead to the disovery of his commission of
past crimes, it is a much more difficult problem. Privilege against self-
incrimination extends to any facts which may "tend to incriminate a
person. ' ' 9 The information is of unquestioned importance in the psychi-
atrist's determination as to the sexual stability of the person, but this
same information in the hands of a state's attorney might very well
lead to a conviction of that individual for the crimes disclosed. There
does not seem to be any question of the fact that such information
would tend to incriminate him for such past crimes.
Under the Wisconsin statute there is a provision that "no testimony
regarding the mental condition of the accused shall be received from
witnesses summoned by the accused until the expert witnesses sum-
moned by the prosecution have been given an opportunity to examine
and observe the accused after such opportunity shall have been duly
demanded." However, this can reasonably defeat the whole proceed-
ings in that the state's evidence can also be prohibited.
The Indiana Statute grants immunity to the defendant in that the
use of tlhe physicians' reports is forbidden in any other proceeding
against the accused.50 An intnunity is also given under the Missouri
Act. Such grants of immunity dispose of the problem of self-incrimina-
tion even when the act is deemed criminal in nature. 51
Under the grant of immunity afforded by the Indiana Statute a wit-
49. 8 WIGMORE, EvmENcE §§2250, 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
50. In 40 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 186 (1949), the writer suggests that this immunity
might be generally opposed by most district attorneys in that it would encourage offenders
to confess all under the protective umbrella of immunity. It was suggested that a possible
solution might be in phrasing the questions in non-incriminating terms omitting dates,
places, etc. or possibly in the elimination of specific data from the actual written reports
made available to prosecutors.
53. These grants in analogous criminal proceedings, have been upheld in United
States v. Weinberg, 65 F.2d 394, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 675 (1933). Also see 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §2271 (3d ed. 1940).
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ness would be compelled to speak under the penalty of contempt of
court. In People v. Redlich,52 refusal to submit to psychopathic exami-
nation constitutes grounds for civil contempt in that the contemner fails
to do something that he is ordered to do by the court for the benefit or
advantage of another party. While imprisonment for criminal contempt
is punitive, and must be for a definite term, sentence for civil contempt is
remedial or coercive, the purpose of which is imprisonment until he has
complied with the mandate of the court. Thus the dignity of the court
and of legal authority is vindicated and the underlying ends are fulfilled.
In People v. Scott, an Illinois Supreme Court case,5" the court held
it to be error to read into evidence a doctor's unverified report as well
as the showing that the defendant had refused examination by the
doctors. Regarding this refusal the court said
"This was a privilege that the law guaranteed to the defendant. There is no law
in the state that authorizes or permits a court, either on its own motion or a motion
of a party to any civil suit or proceeding, to appoint alienists to examine a defendant
or a party to such a suit with a view of qualifying them to testify as the court's
witnesses for or against such party as to his mental or physical condition."
The privilege against self-incrimination, however, must be diligently
sought after.5 4
Jury trial
We are told that lawyers should come to realize that ordinary con-
cepts of what due process requires, do not necessarily apply to all types
of proceedings. 55 With respect to the issue of right of trial by jury
there is varied and mixed reaction in the enactment and processing of
these statutes. It has been held that a trial by jury is not a constitutional
requirement inasmuch as the acts involved special statutory proceedings
similar to those for the commitment of the insane, mentally .ill, or the
control of neglected or delinquent children. 56
In In re Dowde157 the court stated, "it has been declared repeatedly
that the phrase 'due process of law' does not of itself require a trial by
jury in states where usage and statutes are otherwise. '5 8 The Illinois
52. Supra note 46.
53. 326 Il1. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927).
54. "Privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive, resistant,
nor to the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto, but it is
valid only when insisted upon by the belligerent claimant in person." United States v.
Rainey, 10 F R D. 431 (1950).
55. Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 25 MFNT. HYc. 76. This is an excellent article on
the medical as opposed to the legal point of view.
56. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, supra note 3.
57. 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897).
58. Cases cited by the Court: Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S.
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Legislature requires a jury trial for all commitment proceedings. 59 In
People ex rel. Elliott v. Juergens6° a Supreme Court of Illinois case,
the court expressly applied this statute to cover commitment proceed-
ings for sexual psychopaths. It includes not only the original commit-
ment procedure but also the discharge.
In People v. Scott it was held that where the right of jury trial is
preserved, the testimony of physicians is void as prejudicing the jury.61
Other jurisdictions refuse to admit physicians' reports as evidence but
examiners may be summoned as witnesses. This dilemma is obviated
where there is no provision in the statutes for a jury trial such as in
Minnesota and Ohio enactments. In California, Michigan, Wisconsin
and Washington, D. C., a jury trial is permissible and in Massachusetts
it is discretionary with the court. The Indiana Act provides against
a jury trial despite the fact that the Indiana Constitution declares that
the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate in all civil cases. But here




The right of the legislature to devise classifications of persons and
things under its jurisdiction is well recognized provided these classi-
fications are in accord with the aims sought to be achieved and based
upon understandable and reasonable distinctions.6 3 But these classifica-
tions must neither be arbitrary nor capricious but must rest upon reason-
able and justifiable distinctions.
"It (the Constitutional prohibition against discriminatory classifications) does not
prohibit or prevent classification, provided such classification of persons and things
is reasonable for the purpose of thp legislation, is based upon proper and justifiable
distinctions considering the purpose of the law, is not clearly arbitrary, and is
not a subterfuge to shield one class or unduly burden another or to oppress unlaw-
fully in its administration." 12 AM. JUR., Constitltional Law, §476.
Fagueness of statutes
It is here contended that these laws are not based upon "understand-
160, 171 (1894).
Hurtado v. People, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
Walker v. Sauvinat, 92 U. S. 90 (1875).
59. "During the 25 years this law remained on the books more sane persons were declared
insane by jury trials as shown by the reports of institutions from year to'iyear than were
ever wrongfully committed under the earlier system." Dewey, The Jury Law for Commit-
ment of the Insane of Illinois, 69 AM. J. OF INSAN. 571 (1913).
60. 407 Ill., 523, 95 N.E.2d 602 (1950).
61. Supra note 53; Contra: Jessner v. State 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
62. See Note, Indiana Sexual Psychopath Statute, 25 IND. L.J. 186 (1950).
63. Cook Coffee Co. v. Flushing 267, Mich. 131, 255 N.W. 177 (1934). Little v. American
State Bank, 263 Mich. 645, 249 N.W. 22 (1933).
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able and justifiable" distinctions and therefore create an unreasonable
classification. Sex psychopath criminals are not sui generis capable of
identification to merit special handling. The definitions used in the
various laws usually contain two elements-one, an overt act, and, two,
a state of mind. This state of mind is variously defined. The District
of Columbia law defines it as lack of power to control one's sexual
impulses. The Minnesota and Wisconsin laws define it as "emotional
instability or impulsiveness of behavior or lack of customary standards
of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts
or a combination of such conditions". The Massachusetts law defines
a sexual psychopath as a person "who by a habitual course of miscon-
duct in sexual matters has evidenced the utter lack of power to control
his sexual impulses." The District of Columbia Statute describes him as
"any person, not insane but by a course of repeated misconduct in sexual manners
who has evidenced such lack of power to control his impulses as to be dangerous to
other persons because he is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or
other evil on the object of his desire" (Sec. 201).
As Edwin H. Sutherland points out in his article quoted above,
"such definitions state that anyone who commits several series of sex crimes is a sex
psychopath; the finger print record is the only evidence needed for diagnosing an
offender as a psychopath and the services of psychiatrists are not needed. To say
that a habitual offender is a sexual psychopath is without justification."
The term "sexual psychopath" is very misleading in that there is no
general agreement amongst psychiatrists as to the exact technical sig-
nificance of this term.64 In May 1949 the report of the Authoritative
Committee on Forensic Psychiatry substituted "psychiatrically deviated
sex offender" for the term "psychopath," shunned the use of the word
psychopath for the term "psychiatrically deviated sex offender." "The
committee cautions against the use of this appellation, 'psychopath', in
the law. . . . There is little agreement on the part of psychiatrists as to
the precise meaning of the term."
The whole concept of sex psychopathy is scientifically unsound. As
a descriptive term it is misleading. Sex delinquents are more and more
being regarded as neurotic or psychotic, with few genuine psychopaths
amongst them. 65
These laws create an unreasonable classification because they do not
64. Some idea of the vagueness of the term psychopath is clearly illustrated in the
following figures: One psychiatrist in the Illinois State Prison classified 98 percent of
the inmates psychopathic personalities, while in other similar institutions psychiatrists
only diagnosed 5 percent as psychopathic. In the psychiatric clinic of the Court of
General Sessions in New York City handling sex delinquents, 15.8 percent were reported
psychopathic, while Bellevue Hospital, also in New York City, classified 52.9 percent of
the sex offenders it diagnosed as psychopathic.
65. TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 22.
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distinguish between the dangerous sex deviants on the one hand and
the minor sex offenders on the other hand. 66 It is likewise unreasonable
in classification in that (in some states) it does not differentiate between
those offenders charged or convicted of a crime from those not so
charged or convicted. These statutes furthermore create an invalid
classification in that they are based upon the erroneous assumption that
it is possible to identify the sexual psychopath who is about to commit
a sex crime prior to its actual commission.67
In In re Moulton,67Va Justice Kenison made it very clear that he was
only concerned with the constitutionality of the act on its face and that,
only as to the specific attacks against the act made by the defendant.
He said
"It is important that it is made crystal clear what we did not decide in this case.
We did not pass on the validity of that part of the definition of sexual psychopath,
section 2, which pertains to a person suffering from 'lack of customary standards of
good judgment'. This may mean all things to all men and entirely different things
to different groups of men."
He questioned also whether the New Hampshire act was intended to
limit the right of a committed person to question the legality of the
commitment by habeas corpus. He pointed out that the act involved
many other questions of liberty in due process.
The concept of the sexual psychopath is too vague for just legal or
administrative use. When can a person be deemed to be "completely
and permanently cured"? What psychiatrist is competent to make such
a prophecy? He would have to be more on the order of a prophet or
fortune teller than of a psychiatrist. No diagnostic instruments, facili-
ties or criteria are presently available to enable us to make these con-
clusions.68
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONSTRUCTION OF THESE STATUTES
The chief difficulty presented in the Supreme Court decision of
Statev. Probate Court of Ramsey County6 9 is that the Supreme Court
of the United States is definitely committed to the principle of following
66. Many sex offenses are merely misdemeanors. Homosexuality and exhibitionism are
examples. According to the article Homosexuals in Uniform, Newsweek, June 9, 1947, p. 54-,
nearly 4,000 homosexuals were discharged from the armed forces. -
67. Particularly in point here is the New Hampshire statute, which is based upon the
so-called "model statute" prepared at the University of Pennsylvania.
67a. Supra note 10.
68. DR. WINFRED OVERHOLSER, Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, has stated
that "before the law can be expected to recognize this group as calling for specialized
treatment it will be necessary for psychiatrists to come to a better agreement on the
delimitations of the group" Legal and Administrative Psychopaths, 22 MENT. HYG. 20, 24
(1938).
69. Supra note 3.
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state construction of state statutes. 70 The Supreme Court in its decision
of that case said that the construction of the state court was binding. It
was therefore powerless to consider the constitutional questions raised
by the appellant other than in the light of the state court's construction
and interpretation .7
Another difficulty lies in the well-established principle as adhered
to by the Supreme Court wherein all presumptions favor validity.
The unreasonableness of classifications in and of itself is insufficient.
They must be palpably unreasonable to overcome the weight of these
presumptions. 72
CONCLUSION
Knowledge of the nature and development of sex psychopathy is im-
perfect; its meaning is shrouded with ambiguities. 73 As such the term
has no place in dynamic, medical or legal classification. 74 Our entire
legal writ regarding criminal law concerns people who have already
committed crimes. This is the first time that criminologists and legis-
lators have had to consider questions of inherent tendencies for the
commission of crime in the light in which they are treated in the statutes.
Therefore, because the statutes are based upon vague and indefinite
legal psychiatric abstractions implemented by questionable legal ex-
pediencies, they constitute invalid legislation. Quoting Judge Ploscowe
on the statement by Wittels that a psychopathic personality can easily
be detected early in life by any psychiatrist, "he is showing the same
ignorance of psychiatric experience which has characterized the legis-
lators who voted the sex psychopath laws. This experience is clearly
indicated by the New Jersey report on the habitual sex offender."
A re-examination of our statutes relative to sex offenses would
seem to be in order in the light of the startling disclosures of the Kinsey
report.7 5 Much of our sex law is unrealistic. There appears to be no
geographical or sectional similarities. 76 Most sex offenders are charged
with relatively minor crimes. 77 The atrocious sex murders of women
70. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
71. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S. 509, 513 (1933). Hicklin v. Coney,
290 U. S. 169, 172 (1938).
72. Morganti v. Morganti, 222 P.2d 78 (Cal. App. 1950).
73. Reinhardt & Fisher, The Sexual Psychopath and the Law, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 734 (1949).
74. Karpman, The Sexual Psychopath, supra note 26.
75. "Much of what the law denounces as criminal and subjects to serious penalties,
appears to be relatively normal behavior in the human male." PLoSCOWE, op. cit. supra,
note 21.
76. In Louisiana and North Carolina the crime-of rape carries a death penalty, whereas
in New Jersey the offender may escape with the payment of a fine.
77. In New York City of 2,366 indictments for rape during the 30's, only 418 :otr 18
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and children are relatively rare occurrences however much fanfare and
publicity they may receive. For the protection of society from the small
group of major sex deviants responsible, our constitutional legal rem-
edies, the prison, the electric chair or the asylum for the criminally
insane are adequate. 78
The attitude of many sound-thinking jurists today regarding the
efforts of psychiatry in the field of penology still coincides with the view
of Professor Jerome Michael of Columbia University Law School who
said fifteen years ago,
"They are skeptical of psychiatry because of the immodesty of some psychiatrists
which has allowed them to make extravagant claims regarding their power of
diagnosing and solving not only of individual, but of social problems. They are
skeptical because of what they have been able to learn regarding the unreliability
of psychiatric diagnosis and the uncertainty thereof. They are skeptical because
of the fantastic character of the testimony which psychiatrists gave in the courts.
They are skeptical because of the widespread disagreement among medical psy-
chologists about the fundamental problems both in theory and practice. They do
not understand how scientists can differ so radically among themselves about
matters of science, and they are forced to conclude either that those who disagree
are not scientists, or that about which they disagree is not science, but rather
opinions of greater or less validity."
It is a mistake to blithely assume that because of the use of the legal
expediency of civil classifications, no constitutional or procedural rights
such as unlawful classification, denial of due process or equal protection
of the laws, proper hearing, rights regarding self incrimination and
ex-post facto laws, double jeopardy, and jury trial may not be violated.
The underlying purpose of due process is to guarantee to every man his
day in court. The concept embraces the administration of law equally
and impartially, and employs understandable and reasonable rules which
safeguard the protection of private rights. It is founded upon the
basic principle that the law is to be available as a protection of private
rights and interest as well as for the protection of society and that
judgment is to be rendered only after the parties have had a fair trial.
While it is conceded that a statute is not regarded as operating retro-
spectively79 merely because it relates to antecedent events, and while
it is also conceded that many of these procedural and constitutional
rights may not apply in the strict sense to civil proceedings, who can say
when and where the remedial aspects of this legislation merge into the
percent were for forcible rape ("Report of Mayor's Committee for the Study of Sex
Offences").
78. PLOSCOWE, op. cit. supra, note 20.
TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 22.
79. It becomes retrospective if it deprives one of positive rights which the state is bound
to respect or protect. American States Water Service Co. v.'Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606,
88 P.2d 770 (1939).
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punitive. When this happens, the protective shelter of civil procedure
is no longer consistent with the disregard of these rights. Where a
statute under the guise of hospitalization and treatment in reality exacts
or enlarges a punishment, there arises grave doubts as to the validity
of such legislation.
In ex parte Keddy,80 the court, in speaking of the constitutional right
to bail of sexual psychopaths, maintained that this constitutional pro-
vision cannot be legally set aside by civil legislature or by the judicial
branch of the government. The court maintained that no individual or
public offender is "beyond or exempt" from the mandates of the con-
stitution, state or federal, in this regard.
A weakness of the laws is that a conviction is not required and that
not all crimes are limited to felonies. These laws violate the constitu-
tional provision that all penalties be proportionate to the nature of the
offense. They provide for the commitment of a sane person to an insane
asylum "until he recovers." Insane people are in danger of being locked
up upon suspicion in a proceeding which is not regarded as a trial,
but rather an ex parte investigation. It is incumbent upon the courts
and the law to be very alert to insure that the proceedings in which
life and liberty are at stake are at all times fairly and impartially con-
ducted. Judge J. A. Pope of the Chicago Municipal Court said,
"Even if it could be demonstrated that society could be protected from the sex
offenders by some "railroading" process, I would oppose it lest it open the way to
worse evils. The law must insure the full liberty of the individual until by an
unlawful act he has withdrawn himself from its protection." 81
It is, however, generally recognized that there is a class of sex crim-
inals occupying a particular "medico-psychological ' 8 2 status requiring
specialized treatment under the law. Because the full gamut of emotions
and mental disturbances that beset humanity are complex and multi-
tudinous, including a host of neurotic manifestations such as anxiety,
depression, suicidal trends and psychosomatic desires; because of the
wide variance of opinion as to when anti-social behavior becomes crim-
inal; because there is a lack of sufficient objective criteria to satisfac-
torily understand and treat the mental conditions of sex offenders, for
these reasons it is prudent for states to proceed most cautiously in the
drafting of these types of statutes. They may vitally infringe upon im-
portant individual rights protected by our Federal Constitution.
80. 233 P.2d 159 (Cal. App. 1951).
91. A certification by two psychiatrists hired by the prosecution could very readily be
offset by more than two found by the defense who, for a fee, would testify to the opposite.
82. TAPPAN, oj. cit. supra note 22.
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